Combined with the development process and container parameters of Shanghai Waigaoqiao port area, the game model between container terminals among a port area under overload operation is constructed. The equilibrium stevedorage and coalition profit are solved by the backward induction. The results suggest that comparing with the competition game, the container terminal of coalition can charge higher stevedorage, at the same time, the market share of the incomplete coalition container terminal is on the downside, while the equilibrium stevedorage and market share as well as the profit are on the upside. In contrast to the complete coalition, the equilibrium stevedorage and market share as well as profit of the incomplete coalition container terminal are decreasing; the equilibrium stevedorage and profit of the outsider are significantly decreasing, but the market share of it is greatly increasing, i.e., the real winner is the outsider which earns a better payoff without joining the coalition.